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
1970/09/30

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MEETING WITH PRESIDENT THIEU

October 1, 1970

1. We are pleased that Vice President Ky decided to cancel his participation in the October 3 March for Victory rally in Washington.
2. Another problem, however, has arisen which I should like to discuss with you.
3. In discussions with our delegation and with Mr. Kissinger, the Vice President has made repeated reference to the need for our side to go on the offensive with negotiating proposals to counter the impression the communists were trying to give that they had something new to offer while we were saying the same old things. He has suggested this be done as a package which would cover all the main outstanding issues, specifically three basic points:
 - 1) A standstill cease-fire;
 - 2) Mutual withdrawal of forces;
 - 3) A political settlement based on free elections.
4. To Mr. Kissinger he elaborated his thoughts, especially on how elections might be organized, indicating his intention to expand them at a press conference in Paris early this week.
5. Mr. Kissinger said that you and I had recently been discussing possibilities for a negotiating initiative. The suggestions Ky mentioned were under consideration. Whatever we did should be timed to have maximum effect in the U. S., South Viet-Nam, and in Hanoi. Support in the United States is especially important at this time so we can continue the kind of assistance Viet-Nam needs. Therefore, whatever we did should be fully coordinated so that our side would be presenting the same policy. Any differences between us would soon become apparent and be exploited both by our opponents and the press. We need also to bring other countries, notably Cambodia and Laos, along with us. This would require time for consultation and coordination with them.



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By KBH, NARA, Date 6/4/99

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6. The Vice President agreed with the need for unity in our points of view. Kissinger said we hoped to be able to move at an early date and that we would be in close and continuing contact with the GVN.

7. The Vice President agreed to defer his press conference, but we believe that he may assume that we will come back to him after the October 4 meeting of President Nixon and Ambassador Bruce with thoughts on what he might include in his proposals and when they might be made public.

8. As you can appreciate, we do not consider this feasible. The issues are of such importance that we feel discussions during the period immediately ahead should and must be held with you. We are unaware of how much the Vice President may know of the details of our discussions to date. Therefore, we would think it prudent and suggest that you ask the Vice President to return temporarily from Paris for consultations. We believe this is the most practical way to assure the coordination of the complex issues which is essential to the success of our forthcoming initiatives.



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